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BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §77-18a-l(a) and §78-2a-3(2)(e), 1953, as amended.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court err in not granting defendant's motion to dismiss, made at

the close of plaintiffs case in chief, for failure to prove the elements of the charges of
contracting without a license, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(1) and filing for a
building permit without a license, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(4)?
II.

Did the trial court err when it did not grant the defendant's motion for a

Bill of Particulars?

III.

Did the trial court err in terminating a previous consolidation order?

IV:

Did the trial court err by allowing O. J. Peck, investigator with the

Contractor's Licensing Section of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of
Occupational & Professional Licensing, to testify about interpretations of the licensing
laws and how the defendant violated these laws?
V:

Did the trial court err in allowing O. J. Peck, investigator with the

Contractor's Licensing Section of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of
Occupational & Professional Licensing, to refresh his memoryfromhis reports?
VI:

Did the trial court err in allowing O. J. Peck, investigator with the

Contractor's Licensing Section of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of
Occupational & Professional Licensing, to testify about other dates when the defendant
had been licensed?
VII:

Did the jury err in finding the defendant guilty of Contracting without a

License, in violation of §58-55-501(1) and Applying for a Building Permit without a
License, in violation of §58-55-501(4)?
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS CONSIDERED
DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Annotated §§58-55-501(1) and 58-55-501(4).
All statutory references in this brief are to Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 12, 1996, Joe and Myrle Mellen entered into a contract with Evan
Anderson, the defendant/appellant in this action. The contract specified that the Mellens
would get a Skyline modular home; concrete for home, garage and shed; construction of
garage and shed; as well as excavating and grading; septic tank with percolation tests;
driveway, asphalt paving; water trench two freeze hydrants, and power trench for a total
cost of $136,384.45. The Mellens had already purchased from the defendant Lot 3
Harmony Views Unit IV subdivision, upon which the home and other improvements were
to be placed.
At the time the contract was entered into, the defendant was licensed only to do
excavating and grading, landscaping and pipeline and conduit work. On that date neither
the defendant nor his company, Construction and Sales Management, was licensed as a
general contractor.
The Mellens dealt only with the defendant throughout the process of developing
their lot, until they became dissatisfied with some of the work performed by the
defendant and they hired Gene Beatty to finish the concrete work. In fact, all work done
on the lot andfixturesof the Mellen home was done by the defendant or by those hired
by the defendant, and the defendant, Evan Anderson, collected the entire $136,384.45
contract price for that purpose.
Sometime in August of 1996 a building permit application was faxed to the
Washington County Building Department concerning the Mellen property. The fax came
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from the office of Evan Anderson in New Harmony, Utah. With it came information
concerning water right, building plans, septic system plans, and approval for
improvements from Harmony Views signed by Evan Anderson, the defendant. These
materials were consistent with the materials always filed by the defendant by fax. The
building permit application listed the contractor as Spectra Construction Company, a
licensed general contractor, and was approved on September 3, 1996. The permit was
picked up by Amelia M. Anderson, a daughter of the defendant, who signed the
application claiming to be the authorized agent for Spectra. When Washington County
Building Inspector Bill Weaver later questioned the defendant about his relationship with
Spectra Construction, the defendant stated that he was a part owner of Spectra, that
Spectra was acting on his behalf, and that he (the defendant) was acting under Spectra's
license. In fact, the defendant, Evan Anderson, had no ties whatsoever to Spectra
Construction Company. Therefore, at the time the building permit for the improvements
to the Mellen lot was requested by the defendant he was not a licensed general contractor,
nor was he acting as an agent for Spectra Construction Company, the licensed contractor
listed on the building permit application.
In April of 1997, O. J. Peck contacted the Mellens after Mr. Peck learned that the
Mellens were unhappy that some of the work specified in the contract had not been
completed by the defendant. The Mellens became upset because Washington County
Building Inspector Bill Weaver required that additional work be completed on the site.
Following this meeting with Mr. and Mr. Mellon, a formal investigation by the Division
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of Occupational and Professional Licensing was started.
When Inspector O. J. Peck completed his investigation, the results were submitted
to the Washington County Attorney's Office for review. An Information was filed on
July 22, 1997, and a jury trial was held before the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, District
Court Judge, on September 15-16, 1997. Following its deliberations on September 16,
1997, the jury returned verdicts of guilty to the charges of Acting as a Contractor without
a License, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(1), and Applying for a Building Permit
without a License, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(4). Sentencing was held on
September 18, 1997, and defendant subsequently filed this appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State contends that neither the trial court judge nor the jury committed the
errors claimed by appellant. In the first six claims of error, appellant alleges that the trial
judge erred, and correctly states that the standard of review is for correctness. However,
appellant fails to marshal any evidence to support any of the claimed errors, nor does
appellant support these claims with any type of authority from statutes or case law.
As to the seventh issue, appellant claims that the jury erred in finding him guilty,
and again correctly states that the standard of review is that the jury verdict should be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. But again the appellant failed to
marshal evidence to support this claim, and did not support his arguments with authority
from either statutes or case law.
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ARGUMENT
ISSUE I:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE AT
CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF, FOR
FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE
CHARGES OF CONTRACTING WITHOUT A
LICENSE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §58-55-501(1)
AND FILING FOR A BUILDING PERMIT WITHOUT
A LICENSE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §58-55501(4)?

The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss made at the
conclusion of the State's case. The standard of review set out by defendant is correctly
stated in State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah App.1997), "[T]he propriety of a trial
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of law that we review
for correctness," citing Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). Defendant's
argument, however, is not supported by the facts or by any authorities.
However, the State contends that the first issue this Court should address is
whether the jury erred in reaching a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact,
if this Court either upholds or overturns the jury's verdict, the trial court's decision to
dismiss or proceed becomes moot. The standard of review for jury trials is that the
appellate court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and will
interfere only when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person
could not have possibly reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Blubaugh,
904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah App. 1995), (citations omitted).
In fact, even errors of the District Court at preliminary stages of a prosecution are
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"cured if the defendant is later convicted beyond a reasonable doubt," State v. Quas, 837
P.2d 565, 566 (Utah App. 1992); United States v. Mechank 475 U.S. 66, 70, 89 L.Ed.2d
50, 56, 106 S.Ct. 938 (1986). Therefore, the State contends that defendant has put the
cart before the horse on this issue. But having done so, defendant still presents no case
law, statutes, or evidence to support his contention that the trial judge erred in denying
his motion to dismiss.
In the statutes at issue in this action, Utah Code Ann. §58-55-501 (1) and (4),
unlawful conduct is defined as including:
(1) engaging in a construction trade, acting as a contractor, or
representing oneself to be engaged in a construction trade or to be acting as
a contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure, unless the person
doing any of these is appropriately licensed or exempted from licensure
under this chapter. Utah Code Ann. §58-55-501(1);
(4) applying for or obtaining a building permit either for oneself or
another when not licensed or exempted from licensure as a contractor under
this chapter. Utah Code Ann. §58-55-501(4)
Because the defendant stipulated at trial that he did not fall under the exemptions from
licensure under this chapter, we can concentrate on defendant's actions as they relate to
the statutes themselves.
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion
to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case. The fact that the defendant was not a
licensed general contractor at the time of the offenses is evident from Exhibit No. 3,
which clearly shows that neither the defendant, Evan Anderson, nor his company,
Construction and Sales Mgmt. Inc., had an appropriate general contractor's license during
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the time periods in question. Evan Anderson signed the contract (Exhibit No. 2) on June
12, 1996, for himself individually. By the terms of the contract the defendant agreed to
take care of all the work required on the Mellen lot, either personally or by contracting
with others to do the work, in return for payment of the contract sum of $136,384.45.
A general contractor is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition
(1990) as "one who contracts for the construction of an entire building or
project, rather than a portion of the work. The general contractor hires
subcontractors (e.g., plumbing, electrical, etc.), coordinates all work and is
responsible for payment to subcontractors. Also called "prime" contractor.
Utah Code Ann. §58-55-102 (12) defines a general building contractor as:
[A] person licensed under this chapter as a general building contractor
qualified by education, training, experience, and knowledge to perform or
superintend construction of structures for the support, shelter, and enclosure
of persons, animals, chattels, or moveable property of any kind or any
components of that construction except plumbing, electrical, and
mechanical, for which the general building contractor shall employ the
services of a contractor licensed in that particular specialty, except that a
general building contractor engaged in the construction of single-family and
multifamily residences up to four units may perform the mechanical and
hire a licensed plumber or electrician as an employee. The division may by
rule exclude general building contractors from engaging in the performance
of other construction specialties in which there is represented a substantial
risk to the public health, safety, and welfare, and for which a license is
required unless that general building contractor holds a valid license in that
specialty classification.
From the evidence presented at trial it is evident that the defendant, Evan
Anderson, held himself out to be a general contractor. Other evidence provided or
produced at trial, both through Exhibit No. 3 and the testimony of O. J. Peck and Bill
Weaver, showed that the defendant was not licensed to enter into such a contract.
As to the second count in the Information, Applying for a Building Permit without
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a License, it is clear from the foregoing statements that the defendant did not have the
appropriate contractor's license at the time he applied for a building permit covering the
work to be performed on the Mellen property. As shown in Exhibit No. 5, when the
defendant applied for a building permit, he duped Washington County into believing that
the contract was to be performed by Spectra Construction Company. Washington County
Building Inspector Bill Weaver testified that when he asked Evan Anderson about his
relationship with Spectra, "He [Evan Anderson] told me, if I recall it right, that he had
bought in a partnership or something. He had bought into this company and he was now
a portion of Spectra Construction." (Transcript 186 p. 58, lines 7-10) However, at trial
Charles C. Moore, who is the sole shareholder of Spectra Construction, stated that he
(Mr. Moore) had never met the defendant, Evan Anderson. (Transcript 186, pp. 88, 91)
The foregoing evidence meets all the elements of the statutes at issue and allowed
the trial judge to conclude that the issues were ripe for decision, and that the trial should
proceed to the next phase. The trial court was correct and did not err in denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss.

ISSUE II:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DID NOT
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A BILL OF
PARTICULARS?

The State contends that the trial court was correct in not granting defendant's
motion for a bill of particulars. The defendant is correct in his statement that the standard
of review by this Court is for correctness of the trial court's decision. However,
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defendant's arguments are in error and are not supported by any statutory or case law
authority.
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion
for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within
ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court
may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of
particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such
conditions as justice may require. The request for and the contents of a bill
of particulars shall be limited to a statement of the factual information
needed to set for the essential elements of the particular offense charge.
The question that arises from rule 4(e) is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. As the defendant
provided no transcript of the hearing where this motion was denied, it is impossible to
know with certainty on what grounds the court denied defendant's motion. However, The
State would argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant
defendant's motion.
The Court of Appeals will generally "assume regularity of proceedings below
when defendant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." Blubaugh, at 699.
Although defendant re-alleges his version of the facts, this alone is not sufficient to
challenge the trials court's findings or conclusions. Nor does defendant ever plead that he
was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his request for a bill of particulars.
One other fact that supports the State's position that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion is that the defendant was provided full discovery. The defendant received an
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Information which complied in all respects with rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure by "giving the statutory or common law name of the offense, or by stating in
concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the
charge." The Information likewise met the requirement of setting out the nature and
cause of the offense charged which would enable the defendant to prepare a defense, as
required by Blubaugh at 701. In accordance with the open file policy of the Washington
County Attorney's Office, the defendant received copies of all evidentiary documents in
the prosecutor's file, and on February 11, 1998, counsel for the State of Utah mailed via
certified mail to the defendant a copy of the Information on file in this action, and a copy
of the Case Summary prepared by Inspector O. J. Peck with all attachments.
It is clear from the limited record available that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion as set out in rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE III: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN TERMINATING A
PREVIOUS CONSOLIDATION ORDER?
The trial court did not err when it rescinded a previous order of joinder and
ordered separate trials in two pending cases in which the defendant is the defendant. The
decision to join or sever is within the court's sound discretion. State v. Haga, 735 P.2d
44, 47 (Utah 1987). It is also important to note that the defendant provides no transcript
for review, and therefore the court will generally assume the "regularity of proceedings
below when defendant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." Blubaugh at 699.
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In addition, the cases the defendant sought to join involved different victims,
different dates of offense, different witnesses, and different facts, which could easily have
resulted in confusion at trial. Joinder is commonly made only when the offenses arise out
of the same incident, which is not true in the two actions defendant sought to consolidate.
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l.
Defendant is also mistaken as to the standard of review, which is not correctness,
but where it is "affirmatively shown that a defendant's right to a fair trial has been
impaired" State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986). This standard is neither
argued nor proven by defendant. Therefore, this court should find that the trial court did
not err in severing of the two cases for trial.

ISSUE IV: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ALLOWING O. J.
PECK, INVESTIGATOR WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S
LICENSING SECTION OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL &
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, TO TESTIFY ABOUT
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LICENSING LAWS AND
HOW THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED THESE LAWS?
The trial court did not err in allowing O. J. Peck to testify at trial about his
interpretation of the licensing laws as they apply to the defendant and his action. At trial
the defendant at no time objected to the testimony of Mr. Peck concerning this
investigator's interpretation of the law. Defendant claims on page 38 of his brief that this
interpretation of the law covers pages 145 to 204 in the trial transcript. A thorough
reading of the transcript shows that defendant was doing much of the questioning of Mr.
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Peck during this period and defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
It should be noted that law enforcement officers in general are given powers to
interpret the law and enforce it. In Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1978), the
Supreme Court of Utah wrote, "It is our duty to assume that those who administer a
statute will do so with reason and common sense, in accordance with it s language and
intent; and further, that if there is a choice as to the matter of its interpretation and
application that should be done in a manner which will make it constitutional, as opposed
to one which will make it invalid."
It is obvious from this statement that investigators have the authority to interpret
the law and enforce it. This is what O. J. Peck testified to at trial, and the trial court
made no error in allowing his testimony.

ISSUE V:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING O. J.
PECK, INVESTIGATOR WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S
LICENSING SECTION OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL &
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, TO REFRESH HIS
MEMORY FROM HIS REPORTS?

The trial court did not err when it allowed O. J. Peck to review his notes to refresh
his memory during his testimony. In fact, rule 612 of the Utah Rules of Evidence plainly
states that a writing can be used for this purpose:
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' memory for the
purposes of testifying, either
(1) while testifying, or
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(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary for the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at a hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in
evidence those portions which relating to the testimony of the witness. If it
is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter
of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any
portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party
entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved
and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a
writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the
court shall make any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases
when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking
the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that the interests of
justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
Refreshing a witness' memory is allowable, and this was what was done at trial.
Defendant would have this court believe that O. J. Peck just read his notes into the record
at trial. This, of course, was not the case. The defendant did make an objection to this
testimony at trial (Transcript 187, p. 127, lines 18-20), but later withdrew the objection
(Transcript 187, p. 128, line 8). However defendant did object (Transcript 187 p. 151,
lines 23-23) to O. J. Peck refreshing his memory from his investigative report, stating that
the report was prepared after the investigation was completed. In so doing, the defendant
made an objection which has no basis in the law. Reports are summaries of
investigations which by their very nature cannot be prepared until after the activities have
been completed. Investigators prepare these reports for use by their office staff, by
attorneys for both plaintiff and defendant, and for other interested or intended parties at
the conclusion of the investigations. Evidence shows that the formulation of this report
was based on O. J. Peck's investigations (Transcript 187, pp. 152-153, lines 18-20).
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Therefore, the trial court in no way violated rule 612 of the rules of evidence when it
allowed O. J. Peck to refresh his memory by referring to his report.

ISSUE VI: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING O. J.
PECK, INVESTIGATOR WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S
LICENSING SECTION OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL &
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, TO TESTIFY ABOUT
OTHER DATES WHEN THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN
LICENSED?
It is clear that the trial court did not err in allowing O. J. Peck to testify about dates
on which the defendant was licensed. In fact, this issue was not preserved for appeal
because the defendant did not at any point object to the introduction of testimony
concerning the different dates when the defendant was licensed. The defendant cites no
authority as to why this testimony would not be admissible, and gives no arguments as to
how such testimony would be prejudicial to this case. The Utah Supreme Court stated in
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992) that:
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under rule
403, we will not overturn the court's determination unless it was an "abuse
of discretion."... To state the matter more precisely, we review the trial
court's 403 ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding
where, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision that "the unfairly
prejudicial potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its
probativeness" was beyond the limits of reasonability."
Since the issue at trial was whether the defendant was licensed at the time of the
contracting work and the issuance of the building permit, this evidence was probative. To
show that the defendant, who claimed to be licensed at the time, was, in fact, not then so
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licensed but later became licensed is not prejudicial but very probative, and was properly
admitted into evidence.

ISSUE VII: DID THE JURY ERR IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT
GUILTY OF CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE,
IN VIOLATION OF UCA §58-55-501(1), AND
APPLYING FOR A BUILDING PERMIT WITHOUT A
LICENSE, IN VIOLATION OF UCA §58-55-501(4)?
The jury did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
guilty of contracting without a license and applying for a building permit without a
license.
The standard for review provides that the Court of Appeals "must view the
evidence in light most favorable to verdict and will interfere only when evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not possibly have reached a
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." Blubaugh, 694 (citations omitted).
The evidence clearly shows that the defendant was acting as a general contractor,
by talking like one, accepting money like one, controlling the building on the Mellen
property like one, paying money out like one, and that he was not a licensed general
contractor while he was doing these things. The evidence also clearly shows that at the
time the defendant applied for and obtained a building permit he was not licensed as a
general contractor. Therefore, the evidence clearly would allow a jury to find the
defendant guilty in this case. And even if the defendant could argue that there are
alternative hypotheses, it would not be enough to set aside the verdict. Blubaugh states
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that ,fthe existence of one or more alternative reasonable hypothesis does not necessarily
prevent the jury from concluding that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id, at 695. The State contends that we don't even have any question as to other
hypotheses to rule on in this case.
In fact, the State contends that the jury did convict the defendant upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Hamilton, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that
reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court need not be convinced beyond reasonable
doubt, but rather "must uphold the jury verdict unless reasonable minds could not have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Id, at 236,
footnote 1 (citations omitted).
The defendant has provided no authority, evidence, or valid argument as to how
this jury could be so wrong that they found him guilty by less than reasonable doubt and
in so doing were in error. In State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993) the Supreme
Court stated, "[w]e will affirm the jury verdict as long as there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made1" citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
In this case the credible evidence presented to the jury greatly exceeds this
minimal standard, and the jury verdict should be upheld.

CONCLUSION
The defendant has failed to marshal any evidence or authority to support the seven
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issues raised in his appeal, and his conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of June, 1999.

U-**Cc fe
WADE FARRAWAY
Deputy Waslaington Coxmty Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

lml

day of June, 1999,1 personally caused two

true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be deposited in the U. S.
Mail, addressed as follows first class postage prepaid:
Mr. Evan Anderson
3700 East Highway 144
New Harmony, UT 84747

WADE FARRAWAY
Deputy Washington County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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Exhibit No. 2
Signed Proposal Dated June 12, 1999
Exhibit No. 3
Certificate of Custodian of Records
Exhibit No. 5
Building Permit Application
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P R O P O S A L
DATE:

June 12, 1996

TO:

Joe and Myrle Mellen
746 W. Monte Blanco Dr
SLC, Utah 84123

FROM:

Construction and Sales Management Inc.
3700 East Hwy 144
New Harmony, Utah, 84757
Phone 801-586-3478

Project Description:

New Home with lot improvements

We are prepared to offer you the following items,
including the Skyline home you have picked out. Many of the
items are work we are licensed to preform ourselves. The
ones marked with an * are the items that will need to be
contracted out to specialty contractors directly. On these
items we are willing to act in a consulting capacity, to act
as your agent in designing, scheduling, and inspection. You
will note that we have added a 3% fee on each of the
contract bid amounts for this service. Contracts will need
to be finalized upon your acceptance for each item. They
are as follows:
Lot purchase:
Completed previously
*Home purchase (our price
per my bid w/original
options)
$100,000.00
Additional options see
attached list
2,185.00
Utah State ealss tax... 3,372.10
Omit fridg, oven; add
double front doors and
up grade carpet....(net)....+ 345.00
Total
$105,902.10
•Concrete for home, garage
and shed
$ 11,480.00
3% fee
344.40
Total
11,8 24.40
*Garage 28'x32' labor and
Materia]
$
9,273.28
*Shed 20'x20'
3,870.37
Total out building
13,143.65
3% fee....
394.30
Total
13,537.95
Excavating and grading
1,200.00
Septic with perc test
1,850.00
Driveway,16'xl00• (no pavement)....
300.00
Asphalt paving 15x100 1500 sqft @ $1.00... 1,500.00
Water trench/1"pvc/backfill
100'+
2 freeze hydrants
195.00
Power trench/backfill
75.00
Total...(bottom line)
$136,384.45
Submitted by:

Approved by:

Evan Anderson

Joe Mellen

'* ; y ^
Myrle #4elen

^i"%£Ce*2 ^ _

10/27/07

HON 10 03 FAX 801 530 6301

DOPL INVESTIGATIONS

•*-»->• OJPECK

D E P A R T M E N T O F COMMEECE
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Mtch.u 1 O LeaTitt
Governor

Douplus C. llorba
fexccutivi Dirrrtoi

J Criiy Jackson. K Ph.
DiwKion OtrnctOT*

Hetxw M Weils Building
1 6 0 East 3 0 0 South P O Box 1 4 $ 7 4 1
Salt Lake Crty Utah 0 4 1 1 4 - 6 7 4 1
( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 C M 5 e 2 8 Fax ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 0 - 0 3 1 1
Invesbgat/ons Fax' (801) 5 3 0 - 6 3 0 1
http //www commerce state Mt us/web/commerce/dopl/cl<>pn him

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained by the State
of Utah, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, reveals whether an official
contractor license has ever been issued to: CONSTRUCTION & SALES MGMT INC AND
EVAN ANDERSON, and whether such license, if any, is current or has expired.
It is hereby certified that license number 96-321577-5501 was issued by this office for
said licensee on 5-28-96, said license is CURRENT with an expiration date of 7-31-99
EVAN ANDERSON W A S LICENSED AS FOLLOWS:
S310 EXCAVATION & GRADING ON 5-28-96
S330 LANDSCAPING O N
5-28-96
S410 PIPELINE & CONDUIT ON
5 28-96
R200 FACTORY BUILT HOUSING SET UP ON
5-29-97 AND
S216 RESIDENTIAL SEWER CONNECT/SEPTIC TANK ON 5-29-97
AND LENARD WRIGHT QUALIFIED FOR THE BlOO GENERAL BUILDING ON 5-29-91
This license was issued on the basis of EVAN ANDERSON passing the State of Utah exams
and Contractor's Business/Law and Trade, if required, licensing examination, examination scores
are: not available.
Passing score in the State of Utah is 70%. All Utah examinations are given by National
Assessment Institute (NAI) 3 further examination information given upon request.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by virtue of Title
58-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and that I am the legal keeper and custodian of
all records pertaining to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such
records do exist anywhere they would be in my control and possession
THIS certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in compliance with RULE
44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have attached my seal of office on October 27, 1997.

Jarfe Newton, Licensing Specialist
Division of O c p ^ S t ^ ^ l & Professional Licensing
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WASHINGTON COUNTY
BUILDING PERMIT APPLICATION

3093

(Applicant to fill out Numbered spaces)
Job Address

224 So 3 9 0 0 E New Harmony
Legal Description

1. Owner

NEHR-4-3

J o e & M y r l e Me 1 l e n
Zip

2. Owner Address

229358

801-599-1111

Spectra Const Co

801-266-0345

License No.

Phone

3. Contractor

Phono

84123

SLC U t a h

7 4 6 W M o n t e B l a n c a Dr

4. Electrical Contractor

License No.

5. Plumbing Contractor

License No.
TEMP. DWG.

6. Class of work

X

New

I

I Addition

Alteration!

Repair!

I

Move

7. Use of Building
Valuation of Work $

home/garage/shed
8. Notes and Special Conditions

Manufactured
ft=49920

64256-00

Plumbing:

home-2496 sq

0.00

Electrical:

Garage-896

5.00

sqft=14336 storage shed

HCP .002% of Valuation
71-2850-827

128.51

400

Building Permit
12-3221-000

660.00

sqft =6400 (Red Mountian

Service-Set

1% Surcharge
71-2860-983

up C o n t r a c t o r - 9 5 - 2

91463-5501HC&S

PLAN CHECK FEE

Mgmt

Type of Const

0.00

Size of Building (Total Sq Ft)

NOTICE

R
Max Occ. Load

No. of Stories

1

3392

SPECIAL PERMITS MUST BE OBTAINED TO CUT UP
STREETS IN MAKING SEWER & WATER CONNECTIONS, DRIVEWAYS, CURBS, ETC.
THIS PERMIT BECOMES NULL AND VOID IF WORK OR
CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZED IS NOT COMMENCED
WITHIN 180 DAYS OR IF CONSTRUCTION OR WORK
IS SUSPENDED OR ABANDONED FOR A PERIOD OF
180DAYS AT ANYTIME AFTERWORKIS COMMENCED.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND EXAMINED THIS APPLICATION AND KNOWTHE SAME TO BE
TRUE AND CORRECT. ALL PROVISIONS OF LAWS
AND ORDINANCES GOVERNING THIS TYPE OF WORK
WILL BE COMPLIED WITH WHETHER SPECIFIED
HEREIN OR NOT. THE GRANTING OF A PERMIT DOES
NOT PRESUME TO GIVE AUTHORITY TO VIOLATE OR
CANCEL THE PROVISIONS OF ANY OTHER STATE OR
LOCAL LAW REGULATING CONSTRUCTION OR THE
PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTION.

800.16

Division

Occupancy Group

FRAME

I n c . - 9 6 - 3 2 1 5 7 7 - 5501

6.65
TOTAL
Permit Fee

Fire Sprinklers Required

Yes L

No. of Dwelling Units

OFF STREET PARKING

0
Special Approvals
ZONING
HEALTH DEPT.

Covered
Required

No

X

Uncovered
Not Required

Received

YES

YES

YES

YES

FIRE DEPT.

X

SOIL REPORT
WATER

X

YES

YES

RIGHT OF WAY
Signature of Contractor or Aumonzed Agent

(Date)
OTHER

Signature of Owner (If Owner Builder)

(Date)

When Properiy VaJidated (in thisjpace) This is Your Permit
Application Approved By

Date

( ^ ^ ^ U i U X ^ '

NOTE

9 • •J - 9 6

°"*?-is-9,;£-

Payment Received By

1 % Surchargefotate ~Departmentt^fCc
p\ Commerce, Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing
1Q

"3

